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JUDGE GINSBURG:
back.

Good afternoon.

Welcome

This panel is on “All Things Vertical.”

We

will probably accommodate only some things vertical,
but we’ll do our best to cover them all.
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The order you see at the table here is not
necessarily the order in which we’re going to proceed.
We’re going to hear first from Jean-François Bellis
about the Directorate-General for Competition’s (DGComp) recent activities under Article 101; then from
President de Silva of the Autorité of France; from
Advocate General Nils Wahl; and from Jeff Bank, who
will try to bring some of this together, looking at
trends.
Without any further delay, we will turn to
you, Jean-François.
MR. BELLIS:

Thank you.

I will speak about

the Commission and DG-Comp’s recent activities.

But,

after having presented a historical summary of how
vertical restraints have been handled by the
Commission, as you will hear, I have the impression
that in fact we are going back to the 1960s when the
policy was developed when you look at the most recent
decision taken by the Commission in this area.
As you know, vertical restraints have played
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a major role in the development of European
competition law.

In the 1960s the Commission decided

to put competition law at the service of a higher
policy, or I would even say political objective,
market integration when it decided that any
distribution agreement that partitioned the Common
Market should be illegal.
In order to force companies to act
consistently with that policy, they developed this
very interesting definition of what is a restriction
of competition: “Any restriction on the freedom of
action of a party is a restriction of competition”
coming within the prohibition of Paragraph 1 of what
was then Article 85, now Article 101.
For example, an exclusive-dealing agreement
in which a manufacturer would undertake not to appoint
other distributors in the exclusive territory was an
agreement which contained a restriction of competition
that came under the prohibition of Paragraph 1 of
Article 101 and could be valid only if it were
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exempted by the Commission.
That very broad interpretation of Paragraph
1 of Article 101 was not shared by the Court of
Justice in its early case law.
But this did not deter the Commission from
applying this interpretation.

Why?

Because at the

time the Commission had a monopoly over exemptions,
and any agreement which fell under the prohibition of
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 needed to be notified to
the Commission, and exemption could only operate from
the date of notification.
This put the Commission in the position of
being the final arbiter of what clauses a distribution
agreement could validly contain.

So the Commission

decreed that, for example, in exclusive-dealing
agreements the manufacturer could prohibit a dealer
from engaging in active sales outside its territory
but not passive sales.
For selective distribution agreements these
were exemptible if the selection criteria were
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qualitative and applied in a nondiscriminatory manner.
The dealers could be prohibited from selling to
dealers outside the selective distribution network but
should be allowed to sell to consumers anywhere.
For franchise agreements there was a list of
clauses that these agreements could contain, but the
common feature of the Commission’s policy with respect
to all forms of distribution was that resale price
maintenance (RPM) was always prohibited.
Of course, with this broad interpretation of
Paragraph 1 of Article 101 there was an avalanche of
notifications.

When you look at the number of the

cases handled by the Commission — I think that now the
Commission is at around 40,000 — more than 30,000 of
those originated in the 1960s when the Commission
developed that policy.
To deal with this avalanche of notifications
the Commission developed a unique new instrument
called the Block Exemption Regulation, in which it
codified its policy with respect to specific types of
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agreements.
The Commission over the years adopted a
growing number of such regulations, developing —
something which I think was done by no other
competition authority in the world — a catalog of
clauses: some black, which meant prevented the grant
of the exemption; some white, which were consistent
with the exemption; and then there were some
intermediate clauses, the gray clauses.
This gave European competition law this very
unique and strange physiognomy, that of an antitrust
law.

A significant part of it consisted in these

catalogs of clauses, which were legal or illegal
depending upon their content but with no consideration
whatsoever of the effect on the market of the
agreements in which they were included.

It looked

more like a law of abusive contractual clauses than a
real antitrust law.
That was the situation from the 1960s until
the late 1990s because the Commission eventually grew
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tired of enforcing such a system and launched the
modernization revolution.

It was a revolution because

the notification-and-exemption system was abandoned.
The Commission also abandoned its monopoly over
individual exemptions but retained the power to issue
block exemptions.
It’s also recognized that economic analysis
should play a role in the assessment of
anticompetitive practices.

It also admitted that it

had spent too much time focusing on vertical
restraints and should direct its attention to
practices which actually restrict more competition,
such as cartels.
One could say that it took more than twenty,
twenty-five years for some of the Chicago School ideas
finally to reach Brussels.

But I say only some of the

Chicago School ideas because the Commission did not
abolish the block exemptions, which is strange because
the block exemption was needed because there was such
an extreme interpretation of Paragraph 1 of Article
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101.
For vertical restraints the Commission
consolidated all the block exemptions for specific
agreements into one exemption with a streamlined list
of black clauses, which still included restriction on
sales, on resales, on passive sales, exclusive-dealing
agreements, and RPM.
Since the Commission was now accepting the
idea that an economic analysis should be conducted
before finding a given practice illegal, it has
complemented the Vertical Restraints Block Exemption
Regulation with Vertical Guidelines.

These are very

interesting documents because in those Guidelines the
Commission explains how economic analysis should be
applied to assist the anticompetitive effect of a
given vertical restraint.
Very interestingly, for example, in 2010
when the Commission updated the Vertical Restraints
Block Exemption Regulation and extended it for twelve
years.

It also adopted a revised version of the
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Guidelines in which it made it clear that what are
called “hardcore restrictions” — which are the old
list of black clauses which are now called “Article
restrictions” — in fact was not like a per se rule.
Practices such as RPM, for example, or a ban on
passive sales could be permissible when a new product
is launched or an existing product is introduced into
a new market, or a franchise launches a short-term
promotional campaign.
Very interesting ideas, but ideas which the
Commission never applied itself because from 2004
until in fact a few weeks ago the Commission stopped
adopting decisions on vertical restraints.
decisions practically concern cartels.

All its

Enforcement of

vertical restraints was left to the Member State
competition authorities with the Commission limiting
its intervention to amicus curiae briefs in cases
before national courts.
This policy of what might be called “benign
neglect” has come to an end with the follow-up of the
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e-commerce inquiry.

In 2015 the Commission launched a

sector inquiry into e-commerce.

That inquiry was

completed last year, and the Commission identified a
number of practices which in its view impeded the
proper functioning of an EU Digital Single Market,
such as territorial restrictions, like geoblocking and
a few other practices.
As is common when the Commission conducts a
sector inquiry, a number of cases have followed.

I

will prepare a paper which will be included in the
proceedings of this conference in which I list twentytwo investigations which were launched in the last
two-and-a-half years which are really the follow-up of
the e-commerce sector inquiry.
The majority of those cases deal with
territorial restrictions, especially geoblocking,
restrictions on online sales, and also RPM.

In fact,

the first decision which is the product of this
resurgence of interest in vertical restraints by the
Commission was adopted in July.

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

It concerns four

11

manufacturers in the consumer electronics industry,
and it’s a case dealing with resale price maintenance.
The decision hasn’t been published yet; there is only
a press release and a statement by the Commissioner.
This is a case in which fines were imposed
through a new procedure that the Commission has
developed, a kind of informal settlement procedure in
which the companies agree on the level of the fine,
and this will produce probably decisions with very
little reasoning.
The question is: Is the protection of the
single market again going to be the master of the
enforcement of European competition law on vertical
restraints?

The question is:

Are we going to go back

to the 1960s with a very formalistic approach that
certain practices are illegal regardless of their
impact on the market?
In these recent cases on RPM there is a hint
that there might be a horizontal aspect to those cases
because in her statement about the case, the
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Commissioner said that the practices which consisted
apparently in the manufacturers taking action against
online retailers which were charging the lowest prices
could also have a broader horizontal impact because
apparently those low prices influenced the results of
the pricing algorithms and price-comparison websites
which were used by all the retailers to set their
pricing.

But we have to see when the decision is

published exactly what role this played in the
analysis.
All of this comes at a time after fourteen
years in which the Member States have applied the
European competition law on vertical restraints.

We

see divergences between the Member States, with
Germany specifically taking the hardest line on those
cases and other Member States, such as, for example,
the Netherlands, taking a very different approach.
This is not a new phenomenon.

There have

always been divergences in the national competition
policies of the Member States.
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since the modernization and the regulation that
modernization produced, Regulation 1/2003, national
competition law has in effect become EU competition
law, which explains all those references for a
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice on what
are, in fact, national competition cases.
We have now in Europe a competition law on
vertical restraints which is going in many different
directions, and it will be interesting to see what
will be done to ensure that those divergences are
reduced, and also that what was the main achievement
of modernization, the use of economic analysis, is not
lost in the process.
I will stop here.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you, Jean-François.

President de Silva?
MS. de SILVA:

Hello to everyone.

I am very

pleased to be in New York City, so thank you to
Fordham University for inviting me.

I think that this

is the right city in which to talk about vertical
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issues.
I think one of the reasons we chose this
topic for today is that there is a global renewed
interest in vertical relations.

I think that some of

the issues I will be alluding to now are quite
different from those that Jean-François tackled that
were restriction-in-distribution agreements.
I think that there are some legitimate
questions that have been raised: What exactly are
agencies looking at in terms of vertical issues; is it
a real issue?

The second question is, what are the

special difficulties in assessing those risks?
Finally, is it something that you should look at more
in specific sectors — for example, in the digital
economy — or is vertical something that you look at in
any type of sector, any type of merger?
Maybe a quick reminder about the analytical
framework.

I think that there is a consensus that in

terms of the theoretic principles that are being
applied the framework is quite clear.
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There was a very interesting study led by
the International Competition Network (ICN) quite
recently that interrogated a number of agencies.

What

they found is that most national competition
authorities intervened in the last few years in terms
of vertical competition issues, at least in one
vertical merger in the last few years.
Still, what is interesting also is that
those interventions in terms of vertical competition
issues are quite rare.

It is only one among ten of

those interventions, so we can imagine that horizontal
issues are more common.
Second, this report by the ICN shows that
there is a very consistent approach by the national
competition authorities in terms of what they’re
looking at when they are assessing, for example,
vertical mergers.

They are looking at customer

foreclosure theories of harm.
ability, incentive, and effect.

They are looking at
They are looking at

the same factors in all the different countries.
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example, what will be the effect upstream and
downstream, and what are the efficiencies?

I think,

at the least, we are discussing a lot about frameworks
on digital, but in terms of general concepts in
vertical the thing seems pretty clear.
It is also quite common that vertical issues
are deemed to be more complex than horizontal issues.
This is something I will try to illustrate by two
examples.
I wanted also to say that when we talked
about vertical issues in Delhi at the ICN meeting
there was an interesting remark by Andrea Coscelli
from the UK Competition and Markets Authority saying
that in those types of vertical issues it’s quite
difficult to quantify and to have a very sound and
perfect economic analysis, so you must look at all
types of different information, look at the market,
and really try to understand how the market is
working.

I will try to illustrate that with two

examples.
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The first example is a very classic case now
in France concerning the media sector.

This is

related to a very big merger that happened some years
ago between Canal+ and TPS, the very big pay-TV
broadcasters, and a free-to-watch TV group called
Direct 8.
There was when those mergers happened a very
thorough analysis because the agency felt there were
some very big risks in terms of vertical relation
because this new entity that was being created could
harm the other independent channels, for example, that
were trying to be broadcast on pay TV or satellite TV,
and so the power of this new entity could create a
barrier for them to be able to reach distribution.
This is the type of worry that we had when we looked
at the merger.
This led to a very complex decision with a
lot of commitments in terms of trying to prevent those
risks, for example, by defining the ways the channels
could access broadcasting.
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detailed commitments to make sure that they would
still be able to access broadcasting at an accessible
price, for example.
There was also a very big risk perceived in
terms of access to movie rights, for example, or
premium broadcasting rights in the sport sector.

This

very complex set of rules was put into place for many
years.
Last year we looked anew at this set of
commitments, and we did a thorough review of the
market of broadcasting and pay TV.

What we found is

that the market had really changed enormously in the
last five years.
To give you a few examples of the new
elements that we saw, I think one of the biggest
factors was the fact that now you have Netflix; you
have over-the-top (OTT) new actors like Amazon that
are able to distribute some content over the Internet
and not on your classical TV.
had changed a lot.
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This led us to really change in depth all
those commitments that had been in place for five
years.

This led to a very lengthy and complex

analysis that lasted almost a year, which is a lot of
time, and really was quite labor-intensive for the
agency because we had to look at all the elements of
the market.
What can we draw from that?
The first point is that you don’t have that
many cases involving complex vertical relations, but
when they happen they can be very labor-intensive for
the agency and also for all the undertakings involved
because you have a number of markets to take into
account.

Often the effect on competition is not quite

as clearcut as you have on horizontal issues.

You

need to factor in a lot of different elements.
The second question: In the end can you say
that the remedies were effective, the remedies that
had been in place for five years; did we over-enforce
or under-enforce a few years ago?
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difficult to answer that question.
What we can say is that we saw that there
was a possibility for new effective competitors to
arrive in the market.

You only need to say “Netflix”

or “Amazon” to see that now you have very new
competitors.
Also, we were quite keen on preventing any
type of barrier to innovation on technology.

We saw

that there have been huge innovations with the OTT and
Netflix and the fact that now you tend to look at TV
on your smartphone and not on your TV set at home.

We

can at least say that the market has been able to
change and we have seen new competitors arriving,
which is a good thing.
The second example I would like to address
now in terms of vertical relation is the food industry
and agriculture because I think it’s a very good
example of looking at upstream and downstream effects
on competition.
In the case of France, this has been a very
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important issue in terms of competition analysis but
even in terms of political issues and debates in
Parliament.
What is the problem at the beginning?

The

problem is that in France, like in many countries, the
food retailers are quite powerful and they have some
strong competition on price to the customer.

Also,

they have some very animated discussions when they
negotiate prices with the food industry.

I think this

is something that happens in many countries.
Why it became a political issue is that
there is this idea that is being diffused in France
that because of those vertical relationships the
farmers and the food industry are suffering because
the food retailers are too strong, too concentrated,
or they are too hard negotiating the prices.
There is also the idea that the customers
may be losing in the end because they don’t get such
good products because the food industry is suffering
so much that they don’t offer good quality or good
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diversity in product.
This has led us to a series of interventions
in terms of the competition agency, and at the same
time a very strong series of initiatives by the
Parliament in terms of organizing those vertical
relations.

I will give you only a few examples.

For many years in France — and this is
something that is not common in many countries — there
has been specific legislation that says how you are
going to negotiate the prices for the food retail
industry.

You are not free to discuss any way you

like; you have to negotiate at a certain time of the
year; you have limits in terms of how low the prices
can be, for example; and the whole idea is that this
is going to protect farmers and the agricultural
industry.
There was a new big change and debate
starting in 2014 because those big food retailers
started negotiating buying alliances together.

This

led to four buying alliances effectively covering 90
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percent of the French market.
At this stage, the agency was asked to give
an opinion on whether this was going to have
undesirable effects upstream and downstream.

For the

consumers was there a risk that they were getting
lower-quality products?

Were the producers, farming

and the food industry, they suffering because of those
relationships?
This led in 2015 to a new law being applied
through the agency that led us to have some new powers
when looking at those alliances.

There is a specific

obligation to notify those buying alliances to the
competition agency, which has two months to look at
them.
This is something a little bit intermediate
because this is not a real approval like you have in a
merger regime.

But still we are supposed to look at

those agreements and say that if there is a
competitive issue, then the company should change the
agreement of this buying alliance.
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But this was not perceived to be enough, so
in 2017 and 2018 there was a new movement of alliances
with ever-stronger concentration, and also a new trend
that now you have international buying alliances.
That means, for example, if you are Coca-Cola and you
want to be distributed by Carrefour in France and in
Brazil, Carrefour is going to negotiate with you an
overall alliance for all over the world and for
specific regional areas.
This led to a new political debate led by
the government and also to new activity in Parliament,
and the result of this was that there was a new change
to the competition regime.

This gave the agency new

powers, and now we are able to impose some interim
measures specific to those buying alliances if we see
a possible harm to competition.

This is going to

change again the legal framework of those buying
alliances.
But this is not the end yet because we
decided quite recently — this was a decision by the
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chief of the investigation in the French agency — that
we should also look at those buying alliances in terms
of antitrust infringement of alliances that are being
put into place.

At the same time, the law should be

approved in the next few days, and there is going to
be an antitrust investigation to look at those
agreements to see if they have an adverse effect on
the market as a whole and the quality of the product
and in the end the product that the customer gets to
eat.
Maybe some general lessons that we can draw
on those vertical issues have been trying to show, I
think, that verticals are at the center of the most
difficult topics for us but very sensitive and
important topics.

These are topics that we need to

address.
At the same time, they are quite complex.
In the investigation I was alluding to, the Rapporteur
General of the Authority asked for information from
the market, asking producers to come forward and
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asking, “Have you been in effect harmed by those
relationships and negotiations with the distributors?”
This is going to be needed to gather a lot
of data and to also have a very thorough economic
analysis to see if we can in the end conclude that
those agreements are anticompetitive.

I think that

this is going to be in the next few months another
issue that is going to be quite important for us.
Thank you very much.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you.

Advocate General Wahl?
MR. WAHL:

I think it’s fair to say that

vertical restraints was not a subject that anyone
dealt with at the Court of Justice for a good number
of years.

If you wanted to read about it in legal

journals, you wouldn’t find any up-to-date article.
Why was that so?

I don’t really know.

It

could be as Jean-François said, but I think everything
has changed with the exponential growth of e-commerce.
I’m telling you this because I want to put into
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context what I’m going to speak about really.

I’m

going to speak about a case called Coty Germany.
In its Final Report on the e-Commerce Sector
Inquiry, which the Commission published in May 2017,
the Commission highlighted some structural changes
that e-commerce had brought to many markets.
As far as relevance for our subject, the
Commission said there was more frequent use of
selected distribution system by manufacturers and,
more generally, a larger number of vertical restraints
in distribution contracts, and in the Commission’s
view that phenomenon could raise a number of issues —
some new, some perhaps less — from the angle of EU
competition law.
To name but a few of these contractual
clauses the Commission regarded as potentially
requiring deeper scrutiny: as Jean-François said,
geoblocking and geofiltering; requirements to set up a
brick-and-mortar shop; dual pricing; and also
marketplace bans.
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No major action was undertaken by the
Commission.

In fact, the Commission said nothing

needs to be done with regard to the vertical group
exemption and that that should not be revised before
2020.

But, on the other hand, no binding decision

from the Commission saw the light in the aftermath of
the sector inquiry.
As also said before, national competition
authorities were a lot more active in this field.

A

particularity of them took action against so-called
“parity clauses” that are used by certain hotel
reservation platforms, such as Booking.com, etc., but
most of the proceedings were finally settled as the
companies concerned accepted to change their practices
and narrowed the scope of those clauses.
In some jurisdictions the authorities went
further and required more radical changes.

The

Commission acted only later by investing similar
restrictions in the e-book market, and that procedure,
too, was closed by a commitment decision.
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From that perspective it is not really
surprising that not very many cases came before the
Court of Justice that involved vertical restraints.
With the exception of the case that I’m going to talk
about, Coty Germany, none of those cases actually
raised anything of interest, to be honest.
Before going into the Coty Germany case I
also need to menton the situation before this
particular case.

Already in 2011 the Court of Justice

had decided a case called Pierre Fabre DermoCosmétique.
In that case a manufacturer had put an
explicit ban on selling over the Internet for all its
selected distributors of cosmetics.

The Court of

Justice in this particular case actually said that
that was a restriction of competition by object:
selling cosmetics was not good enough to have a
selective distribution system, selling cosmetics was
not as such protected by the so-called Metro criteria;
and it was considered by object — it didn’t need to
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show anything; it was simply restrictive of
competition.
In some jurisdictions — and I think by some
commentators — this was taken as an indication that
now the Court of Justice was going to go back and say
that the approach to vertical restraints would be a
lot more strict than before.

I’m sure one could have

different opinions on that, but it is my view that
that was in fact the reason why the situation came up
in Coty Germany.
Let me go back to what Coty Germany was all
about.

The facts of the case I think were fairly

simple.
Coty Germany is a manufacturer of luxury
cosmetics and perfumes and it has concluded several
selective distributorships, one with a company called
Parfümerie Akzente.

In these selective

distributorships the distributors were required to
respect and protect the luxury image of the products
and, as a consequence of that, they were not allowed
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to sell the products over the Internet using
discernible third-party platforms.

Internet sales

could only be effectuated by using their own
platforms, which should be designed in a certain way
to give the appearance of luxury.

In essence, this

meant a total ban on using platforms such as Amazon
and the like.
Parfümerie Akzente did not accept this
clause, and when Coty Germany tried to enforce it
before the lower court, Coty actually lost the case.
The national court in that case simply said it
considered the clause to be anticompetitive and it
could not benefit from any kind of exemption.

It is

interesting to note that the national court actually
made explicit reference to the Pierre Fabre case as
support for its judgment.
Well, why give up in the court of first
instance?

You appeal, obviously.

So Coty Germany did

appeal, and the regional court posed a preliminary
question to the Court of Justice.
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four preliminary questions.
The first issue was in fact whether the
protection of the brand image of a product is a
legitimate requirement that justifies the setting up a
selective distribution system.
The second issue was whether an online
marketplace ban amounts to “restriction of competition
by object” within the meaning of now Article 101, and
by the same token whether or not it would be a
hardcore restriction within the meaning of the
Vertical Restraints Block Exemption Regulation.
I think it’s fair to say that some of the
Court’s pronouncements in this Coty judgment have been
a focus for debate on what the Court actually said and
what it did not say.

For that reason, I was planning

on simply saying how I see what the Court actually
said, and then to complement the picture I’ll simply
give my opinion of what it did not say.
As regards the first question, the Court of
Justice essentially stated that where the conditions
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of Metro I, which is the mother of all vertical cases
in EU law from 1977, are fulfilled, a restraint aimed
at preserving the image of a product is presumptively
lawful.

In other words, it falls outside the scope of

Article 101.

This is a big thing.

It’s not even

anticompetitive to begin with and you can get an
exemption; it simply falls totally outside.
The Court said in Paragraph 24 of the
judgment: “The organization of a selective
distribution network is not prohibited by Article 101
to the extent that resellers are chosen on the basis
of objective criteria of a qualitative nature, laid
down uniformly for all potential resellers, and not
applied in a discriminatory fashion, that the
characteristics of the product in question necessitate
such a network in order to preserve its quality and
ensure its proper use, and finally that they do not go
beyond what is necessary.”
The interesting part is that the
characteristics of the product in question
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“necessitate” such a network.

That was the whole

thing in Coty.
Here it’s important to emphasize that firms
do not compete only on price but also, inter alia, on
quality and innovation.
In my view, it is plainly irrelevant to
argue that online marketplaces intensify price
competition among retailers.

I don’t think it can be

disputed that while restricting intrabrand price
competition selective distribution systems promote
interbrand competition in other parameters, they
encourage producers to compete on the quality of their
products and they provide incentives for retailers to
improve the shopping experience of end-users.
Why would a restraint that is known to have
such positive benefits or effects be restricted by
object?
I tried to summarize this in my opinion that
I wrote in this particular case.

I said, for example,

that “what matters for the purpose of identifying
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whether there is restriction of competition is not so
much the intrinsic properties of the goods in
question, but rather the fact that it seems necessary
in order to preserve the proper functioning of the
distribution system, which is specifically intended to
preserve the brand image or the image of quality of
the contract goods.”
To me, actually I think this is supported by
another case from the Court of Justice, a case from
2009, called Copad, where the Court ruled that a
trademark licensor can invoke its right to prevent a
licensee from selling to nonmembers of a selected
distribution system.

I think that ruling is based on

the key premise that if companies cannot protect their
intangible property — that is, brand name, trademark,
goodwill, what have you — when dealing with third
parties, they will refrain from licensing and from
selling via independent distributions.
So why would EU law penalize firms that sell
or produce via third parties and favor those that
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produce in-house?

Copad and Coty, in my view, suggest

that EU law is indifferent about the distribution
model that companies use.

There is no reason why

vertical integration should be favored over licensing
or selling via third parties, and there are many good
reasons why the latter should not be treated more
strictly.
Just by answering the first question I think
the Court finally put an end to the interpretation of
the Pierre Fabre judgment.

Before Coty some

commentators argued that Pierre Fabre suggested that
the protection of the prestigious image of a product
is not a legitimate requirement justifying the sorts
of restraints found in the selective distribution
system.
The Court, however, in this case clearly
said that the Pierre Fabre ruling is confined to the
specific circumstances of that case.

I can always

say, like in the discussion we had before lunch, that
the case is still there, but it will be circumscribed

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

37

all the time.
manner.

It will be written away in a gradual

They will not refer to Pierre Fabre again in

my view, not in that sense anyway.
The second question concerned the actual ban
on using third-party platforms.

The Court here,

because it was a preliminary reference, first pointed
out that it is for the referring court to decide this;
but when deciding it they should keep in mind that the
contractual clause in their view had the objective of
“preserving the image of luxury and the prestige of
the goods at issue” and the clause was “objective and
uniformly applied without discrimination to all
authorized distributors.”
The prohibition imposed by a supplier of
luxury goods on its authorized distributors to use
third-party platforms for the Internet sale of those
goods was also, according to the Court, “appropriate
to preserve the luxury image of those goods” and
everything in their view was proportionate.
I can be fairly quick on the third and
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fourth questions because the Court dealt with them
together.
The third question was basically: to what
extent was a restriction like the one in question a
hardcore restriction according to the Vertical
Restraints Block Exemption Regulation?

The Court

simply said, “No, it is not.”
If that’s what the Court said, what did it
not say?
Here I think it cannot be inferred from the
judgment that the Court’s findings are limited to the
distribution of luxury goods.

The purpose of a

selective distribution system is procompetitive
effects independent of the nature of the products at
issue.

Trademark law, for that matter, seeks to

protect all producers, not only producers of luxury
goods.

In my view, there’s no reason why EU

competition law should be different.
I don’t think one could say that the Coty
judgment is limited — and I think we have differences

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

39

of opinion on that — to luxury goods.

It is clear

that the Court of Justice in its answer to the
national court spoke about luxury goods the whole
time.

The reason for that is simple: it concerned

luxury products.

But I don’t think the reasoning in

itself is limited to it.

That is one contentious

question that has to be dealt with.
Second, which is also kind of interesting
but on the other perspective, is the fact that the
Court only dealt with one thing, namely whether or not
luxury products could be used in selective
distribution systems and whether or not that
marketplace ban was okay.
else.

It didn’t concern anything

Therefore, Jean-François’ idea that there will

be more cases is clearly correct.
This was one case, a small case, but I think
it was important.

What was important really was that

it confirmed the normal rules that we had before in
vertical restraints.

That means that the Pierre Fabre

case was an isolated event.
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Thank you very much.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you.

Jeff Bank, you have the task of reporting
from the United States single-handedly.
MR. BANK:

Easy enough.

Thank you.

I’ll start by stating the obvious, but I
think it does confirm that there is convergence
between the European Union and the United States on a
lot of these points.

Vertical arrangements in the

United States, whether conduct or merger, raise more
questions than we have answers for right now.

They

are extremely complex, they are different than
horizontal restraints, and the tools that we have for
assessing vertical restraints need to be different.
I think it’s fair to say that in the United
States we now recognize that vertical restraints
perhaps can do more competitive harm than previously
thought, at least as the thinking went from the 1970s
to the 1990s when these types of restraints were
generally ignored.
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But the question now is: Should they be
assessed in a manner similar to the analyses done for
horizontal restraints?

What sorts of presumptions

should we make about vertical restraints and vertical
arrangements?

As President de Silva noted, what are

the right tests to use, quantitative and qualitative
tests?

What effects should we look at and focus on?
I think in the United States we have

somewhat more guidance on conduct cases than merger
cases.

We’ve simply had more conduct cases,

especially recently.
But I think about this from a client
perspective, and when a client comes to me and asks me
about an exclusive arrangement that they want to enter
into, the answer is almost always, “It depends.”
That’s just not good enough.
I think it’s worth recounting a little bit
of the history in the United States, although it
somewhat mirrors the history in the European Union.
Before the 1970s vertical restraints were
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generally policed vigorously.

RPMs, exclusive

arrangements, rebates, dealer limitations — all of
these were subject to liability findings in the courts
and by enforcers.

The Court in Brown Shoe, a very

famous merger case, found there was vertical harm.1
Then, as in the European Union, the Chicago
School of Economics viewpoints started to trickle in
and enforcement of vertical restraints and mergers
decreased — particularly after courts acknowledged
that such vertical arrangements could be procompetitive in the Sylvania case2 on the conduct side
and the Hammermill Paper case3 on the merger side.

It

showed that the pendulum was swinging to the other end
of the spectrum.
From the early to mid-1970s until the midto-late 1990s vertical restraints were essentially
ignored by the antitrust enforcers, plaintiffs,
courts, etc.

1
2
3

Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
United States v. Hammermill Paper Co., 429 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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I think then a split started that in the
United States continues to today.

This may be

somewhat divergent from the European Union.
Horizontal restraints were, of course, inherently
suspect, but vertical restraints were not.
Perhaps due to the influence of the Chicago
School view, for vertical restraints, whether conduct
or merger, efficiencies were assumed to be greater
than any anticompetitive harm.

There was little

analysis done on a merger-specific basis or a conductspecific basis.

It was simply assumed that if the

arrangement in question was vertical then the
efficiencies would be greater than any harm.
In the late 1990s there was a sea change as
a result of the Microsoft decision.4

It provided a,

perhaps not new but a more straightforward, framework
for analyzing some of this type of conduct.
In the last eighteen to twenty years or so

4

United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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we’ve seen much more nuanced analyses in the United
States of vertical restraints.

There are new

quantitative tools that have been proposed by
economists and academics.

There are new simulation

tools available, both on the merger front and on the
conduct front, to estimate what the effects will be if
certain conduct is allowed to continue or if a merger
is allowed to go forward.
There has also been an increase in
qualitative evidence.

As email and digital

communications have proliferated, it becomes a little
bit easier for enforcers and courts to better
understand exactly why an actor undertakes certain
conduct or why a party wants to enter into a certain
transaction.

Such evidence can better demonstrate

intent, but I think it also can help courts and
enforcers better understand the potential effects.
I think it’s fair to say that right now in
the United States vertical arrangements, conduct or
mergers, are not inherently suspect, but certainly
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there have been significant liability findings in
recent years.

Bundling, exclusive dealing, rebates —

courts have found all of these to be unlawful in
certain circumstances.
Of course, the LePage’s decision,5 Dentsply,6
Meritor,7 and McWane8 are some of the big ones; there’s
the consent decree with Intel.9

It shows the courts

are taking seriously the threat of vertical restraints
and trying to weigh the procompetitive benefits of
those restraints and arrangements versus the
anticompetitive effects.
It is still unclear under exactly which
circumstances vertical conduct or mergers are
prohibited or should be prohibited and what the right
tests are.

Should we look at whether an action raises

a rival’s costs?
look at price?

5

Should we look at output?

Should we

Should we look at whether certain

LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003).
United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005).
7 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp, 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
8 McWane, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 783 F.3d 814 (2015).
9 Decision and Order, In the Matter of Intel Corp., No.9341 available at
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/101102inteldo.pdf.
6
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conduct results in pricing below cost?

Should we look

at whether an entity is sacrificing short-term profit
to knock out a rival?

All of these are potential

tests, and there is really no answer at the moment as
to which test we should look at.
I think this does lead to the recognition
that the United States and the European Union may end
up with the same result when determining whether a
vertical restraint should be permitted, but the
jurisdictions probably begin from a different starting
point.

As I said, the United States tends to look at

vertical restraints and vertical arrangements as not
being inherently suspect, whereas I think that’s not
quite the case in the European Union.

But, I think

the Intel decision in the EU shows that the analysis
is perhaps getting more nuanced there and closer to
how a US court might view the issues.10

Certainly the

Coty Germany11 decision is in line with some recent

10

Intel Corp. v European Commission, [2017] Case C-413/14 E.C.R. I ___
(Delivered September 6, 2017).
11 Coty Germany GmbH v. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, Case C-320/16, [2017] E.C.R.
I ___ (Delivered December 6, 2017).
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decisions in the United States, like the Leegin
decision.12

So there is room for convergence, but

we’re not quite there yet.
President de Silva noted that there are
certain sectors on which enforcers are more focused.
I don’t think that’s necessarily the case in the US.
There is certainly no explicitly stated goal like that
in the United States.

However, certainly on the

merger front, as I’ll talk about in a second,
technology and media platforms have generated a lot of
interest in the last ten years or so.
Let me turn to mergers.

In the United

States the history of vertical merger enforcement has
somewhat tracked the history of conduct enforcement,
albeit with many fewer decisions and fewer actions
taken.
AT&T/Time Warner was the first litigated
merger in the United States in forty years.13

There

have only been about twenty-two or so challenges to

12

Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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vertical mergers in the United States since 2000.

You

can contrast that against the challenges to horizontal
mergers.

There are about thirty to forty per year.

Vertical mergers have not been at the front of the
mind for the enforcers, but I think they are growing
in importance.
Let me talk about AT&T/Time Warner for a
couple of minutes.14

There — I’m sure you all know –

the DOJ alleged that the combination would allow the
new entity to harm rivals in three different ways
primarily.
The first was that the merger would give the
new entity leverage to extract higher prices for
content provided by Time Warner.

To the extent that a

rival distributor didn’t end up purchasing the Time
Warner content, or to the extent there was a blackout
and that rival lost customers, well, those customers
would just move over to DirecTV, and AT&T would profit
anyway.

13
14

That was, I think, the primary concern by the

United States v. AT&T, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1 (2018).
Id.
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DOJ.
The second was a concern that the new entity
would be able to coordinate more easily with Comcast,
one of the other major distributors, or to act
unilaterally to play gatekeeper and restrict certain
must-have content from rivals.

In particular, there

was concern about competition with some of the virtual
distributors who are themselves vertically aligned,
like Netflix, like Amazon, like Hulu, who have the
ability to reach consumers in new ways.

But of

course, if Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon don’t have access
to some of the must-have content that Time Warner was
creating, those rivals could be harmed, and the DOJ
was concerned about that.
Third and last, the DOJ was concerned and
alleged that the new entity would be able to prevent
its competitors from using certain content like Game
of Thrones to promote and market its own system to
consumers.
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Of course, as you all know, the court
rejected the DOJ’s contentions and their economic
analysis in an almost 200-page opinion.

The case is

now going up on appeal, although the merger has
closed.
I think it’s significant, however, to note
that the decision is very fact-specific, and we’ll
have to see if it has any precedential value going
forward.

Of course, an appellate decision is probably

more likely to have precedential value for future
mergers, but it is significant to have a decision on a
vertical merger.

We haven’t had one in forty years.

Of the challenged vertical mergers in the
last twenty years, almost all of have been approved
with either structural or behavioral conditions.
me give you some examples.

Let

Google/ITA, in which

Google was required to license certain technology to
travel intermediaries.15

There were deals entered into

by both Coke and Pepsi with their bottlers where
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firewalls were set up to prevent the wrongful sharing
of information with Coke and Pepsi by the bottlers.16
There was the AMC merger where both structural and
behavioral conditions were applied; there were
divestitures required and firewalls set up.17

Other

deals have been abandoned when challenged, including
the Comcast/Time Warner merger a few years ago.18
I think, given the lack of precedent here
and given the lack of jurisprudence, and given the
lack of Vertical Merger Guidelines put out by the
agencies in the United States, which I’ll talk about
in a second, it’s very difficult to extract clear
guidance for clients.

15

Of course, I keep coming back

Final Judgment, United States v. Google and ITA Software, Inc., 1:11-CV00688 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2011), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/497636/download.
16 See Decision and Order, In the Matter of The Coca-Cola Company, No. C-4305
(Nov. 5, 2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/101-0107/coca-cola-company-matter; Decision and Order, In the
Matter of PepsiCo, Inc., No. C-4301 (Sept. 28, 2010), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/091-0133/pepsico-incmatter.
17 Final Judgment, United States v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc. and
Carmike Cinemas, Inc., 1:16-CV-02475 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2017), available at
https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/955041/download.
18 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Comcast Corporation Abandons
Proposed Acquisition of Time Warner Cable After Justice Department and the
Federal Communications Commission Informed Parties of Concerns (Apr. 24,
2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/comcast-corporationabandons-proposed-acquisition-time-warner-cable-after-justice-department.
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to that, but that is my job, and it’s very difficult
to counsel clients without the guidance there.
I will note, however, that there has been an
explicit shift, stated by the DOJ at least, to favor
structural remedies over behavioral remedies.

DOJ

officials have recently given a number of speeches
noting the difficulties in monitoring behavioral
conditions for mergers, and I think it’s fair to say
that over the next few years we will likely see
mergers, at least when approved by the DOJ, more often
approved with structural conditions rather than
behavioral conditions.
Finally, how best to assess verticals, and
where do we go from here?
One question is: Will the AT&T loss make the
DOJ more cautious and/or will it make them more likely
to accept behavioral conditions on mergers?
Disney/Fox was just approved with a structural
condition; Disney was required to divest certain
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sports networks; there were no behavioral conditions
applied.19
I think — this is just my opinion —
companies will become more aggressive in terms of
vertical mergers because of the AT&T decision, but I
don’t see the DOJ backing down either, and certainly
we have a number of potential vertical mergers and
vertical restraints coming up in front of the DOJ,
including some in the healthcare field.

I know there

have been some rumors over the past couple of days
about those and we’ll see where those go in terms of
what, if any, conditions are applied.
A second question is: How do we measure and
consider the speed of innovation and emerging
technology?

Comcast/NBC was similar to AT&T/Time

Warner, but Comcast and NBC abandoned their merger,
while AT&T and Time Warner decided to challenge DOJ’s

19

Proposed Final Judgment, United States v. The Walt Disney Company and
Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., 1:18-CV-05800 (S.D.N.Y., Jun. 27, 2018)
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/casedocument/file/1075176/download.
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opposition. The additional competition from vertically
aligned virtual distributors changes the competitive
dynamics; President de Silva noted this also.

With

Netflix and Hulu and Amazon changing the landscape, I
think the enforcers and courts are going to have to
figure out how to deal with that.
Last, I’ll ask the question: Is it time to
revise the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines in the
United States?

They were last revised in 1984.

There

is a lot of debate about this out there; there are
reasons to do it and reasons not to.

But it might

provide an opportunity for the United States to align
itself with the European Union, which more recently
revised their Guidelines.
Thank you.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

Thank you, Jeff.

I want to throw something out on the table
and then we’ll ask if there are some cross-comments,
but very briefly because we want to leave some time
for some questions.
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What I find surprising in some of this is
that the empirical literature — none of which was
available when Bork or Posner were first writing — has
been so lopsided in favor of vertical restraints.
This is not dealing with mergers.
There are twenty-some studies that uniformly
come to the conclusion that the particular industry or
restraint investigated was procompetitive.

There is a

meta study by Francine Lafontaine, who was Chief
Economist for the FTC, and Margaret Slade, in which
they found 85 percent of all the vertical restraints
across these studies were procompetitive.

That still

leave you with “it depends” because there’s that 15
percent, or whatever it really is, so it’s not per se
one way or another.
But it does strike me as surprising that
there is any kind of resurgence of interest in
vertical restraints that have been the subject of
these kinds of studies, these contractual restraints
of the sort that Advocate General Wahl was describing.
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By the way, I have remained silent on
AT&T/Time Warner.

The appeal is in my court.

I don’t

know whether I will be on the case, I don’t know
whether I want to be on the case, but I have no choice
one way or another.
Any cross-comments briefly before we turn to
the audience?
MR. BELLIS:

A brief comment about Coty.

I’m very concerned about how Coty will be applied by
national courts and national competition authorities.
One week after the Coty Court of Justice judgment, a
judge in Germany found that ASICS sport shoes were not
a luxury product and would not qualify.

But the

previous year in the Netherlands Nike shoes were
considered to be a luxury product.

You have antitrust

law and are reduced to discussions about whether a
shoe is a luxury product or not.

I personally find

that pathetic.
But there is a problem.

A lot of people

have difficulty understanding that the interests of a
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manufacturer in how its product reaches the consumer
survives the sale of the product to dealers.

These

are seen as restrictions of competition which should
be put in a box, exempted, restriction by object or
not.

I think it’s a very limited analysis which

doesn’t really take into account the broader consensus
that these restraints normally do not restrict
competition.
JUDGE GINSBURG:
MS. de SILVA:

President de Silva?
I want to underline how

interesting it is to see this excellent overview of
the American antitrust landscape in terms of verticals
to see that we might have some convergence on the
general approach.
The first point I want to make is: What is
the attitude of the Court in terms of this type of
problem?

We have a recent decision where the Court

decided not to follow the DOJ.
In the case I was mentioning about the
merger between Canal+ and TPS, the Court in one of the
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remedies – the only thing that they changed in the
Authority’s decision — felt that the remedies were not
going far enough to protect potential vertical effects
on the market, and so they decided that the decision
should be even more rich in terms of remedies.

That’s

one case in which the Court deemed really that the
vertical competition issues were so serious that the
agency should have gone even further.

That’s

interesting to take into account.
Also, I wanted to react to the very
interesting debate about behavioral remedies with
respect to structural remedies.

We’ve been hearing

with interest what Makan has been saying the last few
months.

We are having an internal discussion about

those subjects, and we will be issuing a report making
an analysis of behavioral remedies.
about those?

What can we say

Are they effective in terms of the

issues that we need to tackle?
Of course, we all agree that structural
remedies are much easier to monitor.
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obvious.

Still, in some cases it’s not easy to find

even a structural remedy, and you don’t want maybe to
go too far.
I think there is a real tradeoff between
behavioral and structural remedies, and this is going
to be one of the important topics in the next few
months in France, and maybe in Europe.
MR. WAHL:

If I understood you correctly,

are we talking about one can have a point of view
saying that vertical restraints are nonproblematic
from a competition perspective but there are still
some parts that might be problematic?
To me, I’m sort of hung up on Coty Germany.
I beg your pardon for that.

I see that as an

acknowledgment of going back to the idea that in fact
85 percent is positive; it’s procompetitive.
But they are not simply given carte blanche
to do anything.

They do limit it to that particular

clause and sort of, “Come back and ask us more on the
other parts.”
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First of all, it’s inherent in the style of
the Court not to answer more than they’re asked, but
even so it is an opening for not saying that
everything is gravy.

Something is good, and that

particular thing was good.

Let’s see what the rest

have to do.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

It took us from 1977, when

our Supreme Court said territorial restraints were not
anticompetitive, until 2010, when it said RPM was not
anticompetitive.

It was a long time coming.

Questions from the audience?

We have time

for a few, and we may be able to borrow a few minutes
from the break.

Question time.

Over there.

Oh,

James.
MR. KEYTE [off-mic]:

Do you think there is

going to be a distinction drawn as this plays out
between price-related vertical restraints and
nonprice-related vertical restraints: price-related
because you have the real risk of false positives –
there are lower prices conveniently passed on,
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although that can be a subject — versus nonprice,
where you might get into some more clear guidance with
respect to this?

It actually comes out of Intel as

well, in terms of the length of the restriction, the
foreclosing type of restriction.

Do you see some

clarity coming from that potential fork?
JUDGE GINSBURG:

That was the sequence in

the United States.
What do you expect in Europe?
MR. BELLIS:

Intel, of course, again talking

about boxes, we put it in a different box, the box of
abuses, exclusionary conduct.

The discussion that we

had here was a discussion which was more about Article
101, so it’s not abuses of dominance.
Price-related and nonprice-related
restraints thus far have been put in the same box as
hardcore restrictions.

I think they will continue to

be viewed with great suspicion by competition
authorities and courts.
I mentioned this reference in the 2010
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Vertical Guidelines to define that some of the Article
restrictions, including RPM, could be seen as
exemptible.

I remember that the Commission officials

who were in charge of drafting those Guidelines
expressly said that they were paying attention to the
discussions in the United States about Leegin, but all
they were prepared to accept in those Guidelines was
very limited use of those clauses in exceptional
circumstances.

So not the broad treatment of those

restrictions, as we’re coming now under the rule of
reason rather than the perceived prohibition that you
find in the United States.
I think that in Europe indeed vertical
restraints continue to be seen very negatively.

I

think that the Commission tried to stay away from that
area for a long time, but it has kept the block
exemption, which is based on the presumption that
these arrangements are a violation of competition law.
So I think it will take a long time to reach
a stage where the United States currently stands in
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Europe.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

We have time for one more.

QUESTION [Andreas Mundt,
Bundeskartellamt][off-mic]:

Andreas Mundt from the

Federal Cartel Office.
I think it’s not a secret that we were among
those who were a bit worried about the Coty judgment
because what we see today in our agency — and it may
be the same in other agencies in Europe — is we have
received a lot of complaints from small dealers who
are prevented from selling online by the
manufacturers.

As a result or a consequence of the

Coty judgment, we have a very broad movement by
manufacturers in Germany to exclude smaller dealers
from selling their products via third-party platforms.
That is a natural consequence.
We were always worried that if the Coty
judgment comes as it did, in the very end we wouldn’t
have had three parties maybe that were able to sell
online — that would be the manufacturer, who is always
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found in the Internet; that would be the huge
platforms, like Amazon, that of course are always
found by the consumer; and there might be very large
dealers, third dealers, who are found, too.
But what happens to the small ones?

Don’t

we see a reduction of the competitive process if we
exclude those from dealing online?
All the more, we saw from the sector inquiry
from the European Commission on e-commerce that as far
as Germany is concerned 65 percent of the dealers said
that selling via a third-party platform was vital for
that and that they could not be found with their own
Internet shop if they didn’t have the access to these
huge platforms.
That is our concern that we have, a broad
limitation of the competitive process, since a great
deal of dealers might not be found on the Internet
anymore, and that will reduce competition to a small
group of those large enough to be found on the
Internet.
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As I said, since we receive a great many
complaints today that exactly this is happening, does
that play a role?

Is that seen?

Or do you think that

is a German specificity of the Federal
Bundeskartellamt?
JUDGE GINSBURG:

It was a U.S. concern in

the 1930s but not very recently.

This is intrabrand

competition you’re talking about.
MR. BELLIS:
issue.

Indeed, this is a very old

It’s paradoxical, and I understand of course

the concern.

There is a concern of protecting the

small dealer and to allow him to sell its products on
Amazon, the platform which eventually may put the
dealer and all its competitors out of business anyway.
I understand it’s a difficult issue, but should
competition law be applied to protect the dealers
regardless of the broader impact of the practice of
competition?
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:
about protecting small dealers.
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great many dealers, you also reduce the choice for the
consumer, where he can buy his product and at which
price.

So it’s not about protecting certain

companies.

It’s not about protecting small companies.

It’s about reducing the choice for the consumer.

I

think that is a different issue.
QUESTION [Alexander Riesenkampff, University
of Freiburg Law School][off-mic]:

That’s a restraint

of competition.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:
restraint of competition.

That is a

I’m just trying to fuel

your debate.
MS. de SILVA:

I just want to make a remark

about this debate about Coty.

It’s true that many

lawyers have questions from their clients, and I am
quite impressed by the number of questions that remain
after Coty or the other questions that the Court
didn’t have to decide because it was not what was
being asked of the Court at that time.
I think that this is so important for
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companies because the issue of e-commerce is, of
course, completely vital for many companies today, and
there is this uncertainty in some cases about how can
you translate what the Court said about different
products.

For example, that’s one of the questions

you alluded to.

What about other types of

restrictions that are not in the scope of the Court?
Maybe this can lead us to some thoughts
about legal certainty: What are the ways to achieve
better legal certainty on those matters, and is it
possible?
But I’m really impressed by the fact that
before the Coty decision there were lots of
conferences dealing with it, but there are almost as
many conferences and debates after the decision.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

I think the last word goes

to the Advocate General.
MR. WAHL:

I simply think that it’s

important to remember — and I think that was the point
made in Coty — that price competition is obviously
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important, but it’s not the whole thing; there is
competition in other parameters, too.
It is sort of self-regulating because what
Coty Germany, the company, is doing is in fact trying
to sell more, to increase interbrand competition by
limiting intrabrand competition.
I don’t see your concern about choice.

That

presupposes that there are different groups of
customers, one going along with the platforms, one
going for platforms and individual, and one going for
the individual.

There are no such indications in the

sector inquiry, for example, and I don’t think there
is anything in that.
But I do acknowledge that the situation is
different in different countries.

I know the

situation is clearly different in Germany.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:

That’s the

point.
MR. WAHL:

To be honest, I haven’t really

understood why it is so different, but it is

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

69

different.
Just as a twist, I heard because when I was
at a seminar in Düsseldorf that apparently Coty
Germany, the mother company, now has started selling
on Amazon for some reason or another.

I don’t know

why.
QUESTIONER [Mr. Mundt][off-mic]:

I wonder

if all this has to be taken into account because these
are all new questions that have not been answered by
the Coty judgment.
MR. WAHL:

What is taken into account in the

judgment was what was put forward before the Court.
JUDGE GINSBURG:

For this very reason we

must reconvene in a couple of years and pick up from
where we are now.
Please join me in thanking the panel.
MR. KEYTE:

So let’s take fifteen minutes,

and then we’ll have the health care panel.
[Adjourned:
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3:08 p.m.]

Thank you.

